The Evolution of Anti-natalist Philosophy and A Critical Review of Contemporary Ethical Frameworks
Sabah Elroubat
The City College of New York
ENG 21002: Writing for the Social Sciences
Crystal Rodwell
May 5, 2025
Abstract
This literature review examines the philosophical underpinnings of antinatalism—the ethical position that assigns negative value to birth—and traces how its arguments have evolved over time by analyzing the ethical frameworks employed by contemporary scholars. The literature reveals a complex interplay between utilitarian, deontological, and rights-based approaches to antinatalism. Contemporary studies demonstrate that while antinatalism remains controversial, it has gained academic legitimacy through increasingly philosophical arguments that challenge traditional pronatalist assumptions. This review identifies several critical gaps in current research, particularly regarding cross-cultural perspectives and the tension between antinatalist principles and human psychological needs.
Introduction
Antinatalism, the philosophical position that assigns negative moral value to birth, has undergone significant evolution since its earliest formulations. Some recent researches has examined whether aspects of antinatalist thinking is older than the formal philosophy itself, suggesting that elements of these ideas may have deep historical roots, the idea, is not new! Looking back at ancient Greeks philosophers, it is obvious that the question of existing and bringing new lives to this existing was discussed. (“Did Antinatalism Precede Philosophy?”, 2024).
This review addresses the research question: How have philosophical arguments for antinatalism evolved and what ethical frameworks do contemporary scholars use to support or refute these positions? The question is significant because antinatalism challenges deeply held cultural and biological assumptions about reproduction and the value of human existence. Understanding the philosophical foundations of antinatalism provides insight into fundamental questions of ethics, meaning, and value that extend beyond reproductive choices to larger questions about human existence and suffering.
This philosophy is now taking seriously, after it was once dismissed as fringe philosophy, yet significant gaps remain in addressing the comparative weighting of suffering versus positive experiences and in reconciling antinatalist principles with human psychological needs for meaning and continuity of existing.
This literature review synthesizes academic resources published primarily in the last three decades, with particular emphasis on recent contributions. Sources were selected based on their relevance to the research question, with emphasis on works that explicitly engage with philosophical arguments for or against antinatalism and that identify their ethical frameworks.
The question of antinatalism’s pre-philosophical origins offers valuable insight into how these ideas developed over time. According to “Did Antinatalism Precede Philosophy?” (2024), antinatalist sentiments may have existed as intuitive responses to suffering long before their systematic philosophical articulation. This assumption suggests that the idea of bringing sentient beings into existence exposes them to suffering—may be a enduring human insight rather than merely a modern philosophical innovation. So if antinatalism is framed as just a recent philosophical fad, it’s easier to dismiss. But if these concerns have deep historical roots in human experience, they become harder to wave away as contemporary pessimism or intellectual fashion.
–
Shiffrin’s (1999) consent-based framework represents a crucial analytical breakthrough that grounds antinatalism in established moral principles rather than disputed claims about suffering. She distinguishes between harms that occur within a life and the harm of coming into existence itself, arguing that creating new life necessarily involves imposing non-consensual harm. Shiffrin writes: “All I mean to advance is the claim that because procreation involves a nonconsensual imposition of significant burdens, it is morally problematic and its imposer may justifiably be held responsible for its harmful results” (p. 139). This framework provides antinatalism with philosophical grounding that doesn’t rely on controversial empirical claims about suffering predominance, though it raises questions about how consent principles can meaningfully apply to non-existent beings.
Contemporary antinatalist research has seen the emergence of more personal, confessional approaches alongside formal philosophical arguments. Häyry (2024b) provides a notable example in “Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher,” where he reflects on the personal and intellectual journey that led him to antinatalist conclusions. “Consequentialist ethicists can point out, as Benatar does, that human lives are bad and that it would be wrong of us to create more of them” (P. 7) This acknowledges the emotional and existential dimensions of antinatalist thought, demonstrating how philosophical positions on procreation can be deeply intertwined with personal experiences and values.
Building on consent-based arguments, Häyry and Sukenick (2024) propose a “lifestyle imposition” argument focusing on how procreation unavoidably imposes a particular mode of existence without consent. This represents an evolution in deontological approaches by shifting focus from harm to autonomy–that it is not bad to have children because they will suffer, but because they did not give you permission or consent to bring hem to life, whether it is good or bad. Similarly, Häyry’s (2024a) gift-based framework conceptualizes procreation as a morally problematic gift that imposes burdens without consent and “If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of Nonexistence” was the title of his published paper, summarizing almost the whole argument, that existence always imposes suffering (which is bad), while nonexistence precludes both suffering and pleasure (with the absence of pleasure being neutral rather than bad).
The strength of Häyry’s gift metaphor lies in its rhetorical power to reframe familiar pronatalist language by calling birth a “gift”. Häyry also struggles to account for the possibility that some recipients might “would want to be rather than not to be; and that once people are born, their willingness to stay alive shows that existence is preferable to nonexistence” raising questions, again, about whether hypothetical preferences of potential persons can be actually determined.
A notable recent development in antinatalist philosophy comes from Häyry and Sukenick (2024), who propose a “lifestyle imposition” argument. This approach focuses on how procreation unavoidably imposes a particular mode of existence—a “lifestyle”—on new persons without their consent. In which he called: “those from the overall poor quality of human life, the risk of creating a new suffering existence, and the lack of consent by the possible future individuals.”
What distinguishes this framework from earlier consent-based arguments is its focus not simply on harm but on the compulsory nature of existence itself. The authors suggest that even if a good life were guaranteed, the imposition of any lifestyle without consent remains morally problematic. This argument particularly faces the challenge of explaining why potential harm or suffering outweigh the potential benefits of existence. Furthermore, the lifestyle imposition argument, struggles with the logical problem of how can non-existent beings possibly consent to coming into existence?
Rieder (2016) expands antinatalist thinking beyond individual harms to consider broader environmental implications in “Toward a Small Family Ethic.” This work represents an important evolution in antinatalist arguments by connecting individual procreative decisions to collective environmental impacts. Rieder said that he is “quite worried that the earth cannot sustain any more people” and that Earth is “likely cannot sustain us”.
While not advocating complete antinatalism, Rieder’s work demonstrates how antinatalist considerations are increasingly incorporated into environmental ethics. This “small family ethic” represents a pragmatic compromise between traditional pronatalism and strict antinatalism, suggesting that environmental concerns should significantly constrain procreative choices even if they don’t eliminate them entirely. Rieder’s mentioned that “although population growth is slowing down, it is not doing so quickly enough.”, meaning that population should go down for good. Rieder’s approach is particularly effective in shifting the antinatalism conversation from abstract philosophical principles to concrete ethical guidelines with practical applications.
Smuts (2013) challenges antinatalism through a value-centric framework, arguing that a life worth living is one in which the good things in life outweigh the bad. By focusing on values rather than merely pleasures or pains, Smuts shifts the discussion to broader questions of meaning.
This represents an important evolution in responses to antinatalism, shifting the discussion from hedonic calculations to broader questions of value and meaning. His approach is particularly effective at addressing the existential dimensions of antinatalism that purely utilitarian calculations miss, but it leaves unresolved the question of whether anyone has the right to make value judgments that result in another’s existence, regardless of the potential values that existence might contain.
McMahan (2013) examines antinatalism through person-affecting principles, observing that it cannot be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist, If non-existence cannot be compared to existence for a specific person, then procreation cannot be judged harmful or beneficial to the person created, exposing a fundamental logical challenge for both antinatalist and pronatalist arguments.
The authors note that antinatalism is often unfairly labeled as a nihilistic view, when it actually represents “an ethic of compassion” concerned with preventing suffering across multiple domains.
The evolution of antinatalist philosophy reveals several important patterns and tensions in contemporary ethical thought. First, there has been a notable shift from purely consequentialist arguments focused on the inevitability of suffering to more complex, multi-dimensional frameworks incorporating deontological principles, rights-based concerns, and environmental considerations. This diversification of approaches strengthens antinatalist philosophy by providing multiple routes to similar conclusions, though it also introduces potential inconsistencies as in why they are sure that the kids are coming into life of suffering, and can’t we solve the environmental problems in any other way?
A critical comparison of these frameworks reveals that deontological approaches based on consent and autonomy (like Shiffrin’s non-consensual harm argument and Häyry and Sukenick’s lifestyle imposition argument) offer the strongest philosophical foundation for antinatalism. These approaches remain compelling even if one rejects pessimistic assumptions about the predominance of suffering in human life. However, these consent-based arguments face the logical challenge identified by McMahan—how can principles of consent meaningfully apply to non-existent beings? This paradox remains insufficiently addressed in this topic.
The confessional approaches emerging in recent scholarship (such as Häyry’s personal reflections) add valuable lived dimensions to antinatalist discourse but risk reducing philosophical positions to matters of personal preference. Unfortunately this tension between universal ethical principles and individual lived experience remains unresolved in this feild.
Critical responses to antinatalism, particularly Smuts’s value-centric framework, highlight significant weaknesses in purely calculations of suffering versus pleasure
The philosophical underpinnings of antinatalism have evolved significantly from possibly pre-philosophical intuitions about suffering to incorporate diverse ethical frameworks including deontological approaches, prudential arguments, and environmental ethics. Contemporary scholarship demonstrates that antinatalism has developed into a sophisticated philosophical position worthy of serious academic consideration, even as it remains controversial.
The evolution of antinatalist arguments reflects broader shifts in ethical thought, including increasing attention to consent, autonomy, and environmental impacts. While early antinatalist thinking focused primarily on the inevitability of individual suffering, contemporary frameworks engage with complex questions regarding lifestyle imposition, the perspective of potential persons, and the implications of procreation for environmental sustainability.
This philosophy has many gaps that merit further investigation. First, the field lacks rigorous empirical research on how antinatalist philosophical principles translate into lived experiences and decision-making processes for individuals considering procreation. Second, the literature has inadequately addressed the potential psychological consequences of widespread antinatalist beliefs, particularly regarding meaning-making and social cohesion in societies that might embrace such perspectives. Lasty, most antinatalists are focusing more on the bad sides of life than the good sides, concluding that whoever is coming to existence would definitely suffer.
Future research might productively explore the relationship between antinatalism and and genetic engineering, which will raise new questions about bringing sentient beings into existence. Additionally, further work is needed to address the apparent paradox identified by McMahan regarding person-affecting principles and their application to potential persons.
References
Matti Häyry (2024). Did Antinatalism Precede Philosophy?. Studia Humana, 13(4), 2024. 35-37. https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2024-0023
Häyry, M. (2024a). If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of Nonexistence. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 33(1), 48–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180122000317
McMahan, J. (2013). Causing people to exist and saving people’s lives. The Journal of Ethics, 17(1-2), 5-35.
Rieder, T. N. (2016). Toward a small family ethic: How overpopulation and climate change are affecting the morality of procreation. Springer.
Shiffrin, S. V. (1999). Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm. Legal Theory, 5(2), 117-148.
Smuts, A. (2013). To be or never to have been: Anti-natalism and a life worth living. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16(4), 559-566.
Leave a Reply