Sabah Elroubat
City College of New York
ENGL 21002 Writing for the Social Science
Dr. Crystal Rodwell
April 21, 2025
Annotated Bibliography
1- Häyry, M., & Sukenick, A. (2024). Imposing a Lifestyle: A New Argument for
Antinatalism. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 33(2), 238–259.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180123000385
“We do not harm them by not producing them. If their lives turn out to be bad, on the other hand, we do harm them by bringing them into existence.”
This article presents a novel philosophical argument for antinatalism centered on the concept of lifestyle imposition. Häyry and Sukenick contend that procreation inherently involves forcing a comprehensive “package deal” of experiences, perspectives, and obligations onto new individuals without their consent. They meticulously analyze how parents inevitably impose not just biological existence but an entire framework of living upon children – including sociocultural contexts, economic circumstances, moral frameworks, and psychological predispositions. The authors distinguish their approach from previous antinatalist arguments (like Benatar’s asymmetry theory) by focusing on the ethical implications of this non-consensual imposition rather than purely consequentialist harm assessments. Their argument expands antinatalist discourse by addressing the fundamental moral problem of determining another’s existence parameters without their input. The article systematically explores potential counterarguments, including retrospective consent theories and necessity-based justifications, ultimately demonstrating their inadequacy against the lifestyle imposition concern. This source is particularly relevant to antinatalism research as it introduces a philosophically distinctive framework that bridges deontological and virtue ethics considerations, moving beyond the predominantly consequentialist focus of earlier antinatalist literature. By reframing procreation as an act of comprehensive lifestyle imposition, the authors provide a substantive new theoretical foundation for antinatalist ethics that addresses questions of autonomy, consent, and moral responsibility central to contemporary reproductive ethics debates.
2- Häyry, M. (2024). Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180123000634
Matti Häyry presents a deeply personal yet philosophically rigorous examination of antinatalism through the lens of his own intellectual journey. The article’s main thesis argues that bringing new sentient beings into existence is morally problematic because it inevitably exposes them to suffering without their consent, while also acknowledging the complex emotional and social factors that influence reproductive decisions despite philosophical arguments. Häyry carefully navigates both utilitarian and Kantian ethical frameworks to support his antinatalist position, distinguishing between descriptive claims about life’s quality and prescriptive arguments about procreative ethics. What makes this source particularly relevant to the study of antinatalism is its rare combination of scholarly philosophical analysis with autobiographical elements, providing insight into how antinatalist convictions develop and persist in the face of social opposition. The article also addresses recent criticisms of antinatalism, particularly those from pronatalist perspectives, while connecting the philosophy to broader discussions about healthcare ethics, reproductive technologies, and future generations—making it an invaluable contemporary contribution that contextualizes antinatalism within both academic discourse and lived experience.
3- Häyry, M. (2024). If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of
Nonexistence. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 33(1), 48–59.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180122000317
Again, Häyry’s article presents a sophisticated philosophical defense of antinatalism by examining reproductive ethics this time through the lens of gift-giving, arguing that nonexistence should be considered the ultimate gift rather than life itself. The author systematically evaluates the act of procreation by analyzing how conventional understanding of gifts (as voluntary, beneficial, and respectful) conflicts with bringing
new beings into existence, since offspring cannot consent to existence, may experience significant suffering, and have their autonomy compromised by the predetermined conditions of their birth. Häyry builds upon David Benatar’s asymmetry argument that avoiding harm through non-existence is morally preferable to the potential goods of
existence, while expanding this framework to address both secular and religious perspectives on existence. The article’s central contribution to antinatalism scholarship lies in its reframing of reproductive ethics around the concept of “giftedness,” challenging the cultural assumption that life is inherently a positive gift and instead arguing that abstaining from procreation represents a more ethical position given the impossibility of guaranteeing a beneficial existence. This work is highly relevant to research on antinatalism as it provides a contemporary philosophical framework that bridges abstract ethical theory with practical reproductive decision-making, offering a nuanced argument that engages with both bioethical concerns about reproductive choices and deeper philosophical questions about the moral value of existence versus non-existence.
4- Did Antinatalism Precede Philosophy? (2024). Studia Humana (Rzeszów), 13(4), 35–37. https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2024-0023
This article explores the historical origins of antinatalist thought, challenging the common assumption that antinatalism emerged primarily as a modern philosophical construct. The authors investigate evidence of antinatalist sentiments in pre-philosophical contexts, including ancient religious texts, folk wisdom, and cultural practices across diverse civilizations that questioned the morality of bringing new life into existence. The research traces how these early expressions of life-negating perspectives laid groundwor for more formalized antinatalist arguments later articulated by philosophers like Schopenhauer and Benatar. Through textual analysis of historical sources, the article demonstrates that the core antinatalist intuition—that birth introduces suffering that could have been avoided through non-existence—has deep anthropological roots predating systematic philosophy. This source is particularly relevant to antinatalism research
because it establishes the philosophical position within a broader historical and crosscultural context, suggesting that antinatalism responds to universal human concerns rather than being merely a contemporary intellectual movement. By positioning antinatalism as an enduring ethical question across human history rather than a novel
philosophical invention, the article provides valuable perspective for understanding both the longevity and the potential universality of antinatalist considerations in human thought, enriching contemporary antinatalist discourse by connecting it to its historical antecedents.
5- Räsänen, J., & Häyry, M. (2023). Antinatalism—Solving everything everywhere all at once? Bioethics, 37(9), 829–830. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13230
Räsänen and Häyry’s article, again, examines antinatalism’s scope and implications as a philosophical position. The authors argue that while antinatalism offers a radical solution to various global problems—from climate change to resource depletion—by suggesting that ceasing human reproduction would eliminate future suffering, this perspective deserves deeper scrutiny. They position the editorial as an introduction to a special issue exploring diverse dimensions of antinatalist thought, highlighting how antinatalism spans multiple ethical framework including consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The editorial’s central thesis suggests that antinatalism’s appeal lies in its elegant simplicity: if no more humans existed, human-caused problems would disappear. However, the authors prompt readers to consider whether this solution is practical, desirable, or morally justified. This source is particularly relevant to the study of antinatalism as it provides a contemporary academic framing of the debate, acknowledging both the philosophical depth of antinatalist arguments and their practical implications. The editorial’s placement in a bioethics journal also contextualizes antinatalism within broader discussions of procreative ethics, environmental sustainability, and human welfare—positioning it not as a fringe philosophy but as a serious ethical perspective warranting scholarly attention in discussions about humanity’s future.
6- Teo, M. T. L. (2024). Best to possibly not be: A prudential argument for antinatalism. Bioethics, 38(8), 722–727. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13330
The article advances a novel prudential argument for antinatalism by focusing on the intrinsic welfare value of existence versus non-existence from the perspective of potential future persons. Unlike traditional antinatalist arguments that rely on the asymmetry thesis or
harm-based reasoning, Teo develops what he terms a “risk-of-harm argument” which contends that non-existence is the prudentially safer option for potential persons given the inevitable risks of serious harm in any human life. The article methodically analyzes how even in scenarios involving lives with positive welfare values, the absence of
consciousness in non-existence means there is no subject who can be deprived of potential goods, whereas existence invariably exposes individuals to risks of severe suffering without their consent. This prudential framework is particularly relevant to antinatalism discourse as it shifts the ethical focus from abstract philosophical considerations to practical risk assessments that would be reasonable for a potential
person to make if they could choose whether to come into existence. By framing antinatalism through risk evaluation rather than moral absolutism, Teo provides an important contribution that strengthens the philosophical foundation of antinatalism while addressing common objections about the value of pleasurable experiences in potentially good lives. The article shows how antinatalism can be grounded in rational self-interest considerations rather than purely deontological or consequentialist moral theories.
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