Antinatalism Literature Review

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Introduction Section

Paragraph 1: Defines antinatalism as assigning negative moral value to birth; establishes that this philosophy has evolved significantly and may have ancient philosophical roots dating back to Greek philosophers.

Paragraph 2: States research question about how philosophical arguments for antinatalism have evolved and what ethical frameworks scholars use; explains significance by noting antinatalism challenges cultural assumptions about reproduction and human existence.

Paragraph 3: Positions antinatalism as now taken seriously despite previous dismissal as fringe; identifies gaps in comparative weighting of suffering vs. positive experiences and reconciling antinatalist principles with human psychological needs.

Paragraph 4: Describes methodology – synthesizes academic resources from last three decades with emphasis on recent contributions selected for relevance to research question.

Paragraph 5: Discusses pre-philosophical origins of antinatalism, arguing these ideas may represent enduring human insights rather than modern innovations, making them harder to dismiss as contemporary pessimism.

Body – Consent-Based Frameworks

Paragraph 6: Analyzes Shiffrin’s (1999) consent-based framework as analytical breakthrough grounding antinatalism in established moral principles rather than disputed suffering claims; notes strength in avoiding controversial empirical claims but raises questions about consent applying to non-existent beings.

Paragraph 7: Introduces contemporary confessional approaches through Häyry’s (2024b) personal reflections, demonstrating how philosophical positions intertwine with personal experiences and values.

Paragraph 8: Examines Häyry and Sukenick’s (2024) “lifestyle imposition” argument focusing on autonomy rather than harm – procreation imposes existence without consent regardless of quality.

Paragraph 9: Discusses strengths and weaknesses of Häyry’s gift-based framework – rhetorical power in reframing birth as problematic “gift” but struggles with accounting for people who prefer existence over non-existence.

Paragraph 10: Further develops lifestyle imposition argument, noting focus on compulsory nature of existence itself rather than just harm; identifies challenges in explaining why potential harm outweighs potential benefits and logical problem of non-existent beings consenting.

Body – Environmental and Value-Based Approaches

Paragraph 11: Analyzes Rieder’s (2016) environmental expansion of antinatalist thinking through “small family ethic,” connecting individual procreative decisions to collective environmental impacts as pragmatic compromise.

Paragraph 12: Continues Rieder analysis, noting effectiveness in shifting conversation from abstract principles to practical guidelines with concrete applications.

Paragraph 13: Examines Smuts’s (2013) value-centric challenge to antinatalism, arguing life worth living when good outweighs bad through values rather than just pleasures/pains.

Paragraph 14: Continues Smuts analysis, highlighting effectiveness at addressing existential dimensions missed by utilitarian calculations but leaving unresolved questions about right to make value judgments resulting in another’s existence.

Paragraph 15: Discusses McMahan’s (2013) person-affecting principles analysis, identifying fundamental logical challenge that existence cannot be compared to non-existence for specific person, affecting both antinatalist and pronatalist arguments.

Paragraph 16: Brief note about antinatalism being unfairly labeled nihilistic when actually representing “ethic of compassion.”

Discussion/Analysis

Paragraph 17: Identifies patterns in antinatalist evolution – shift from purely consequentialist to multi-dimensional frameworks; notes diversification strengthens philosophy but introduces potential inconsistencies.

Paragraph 18: Compares frameworks, arguing deontological approaches based on consent provide strongest foundation even without pessimistic assumptions about suffering; identifies McMahan’s consent paradox as unresolved challenge.

Paragraph 19: Discusses tension between confessional approaches adding lived dimensions versus risk of reducing philosophical positions to personal preference; notes this remains unresolved.

Paragraph 20: Notes how critical responses like Smuts highlight weaknesses in suffering versus pleasure calculations.

Conclusion

Paragraph 21: Summarizes evolution from pre-philosophical intuitions to diverse ethical frameworks including deontological, prudential, and environmental approaches; establishes antinatalism as sophisticated philosophical position worthy of academic consideration.

Paragraph 22: Reflects on how antinatalist evolution mirrors broader ethical shifts toward consent, autonomy, and environmental concerns; contrasts early suffering-focused arguments with contemporary complex frameworks.

Paragraph 23: Identifies three main gaps: lack of empirical research on lived experiences, inadequate attention to psychological consequences of widespread antinatalist beliefs, and overemphasis on negative aspects of existence.

Paragraph 24: Suggests future research directions including relationship between antinatalism and genetic engineering, and need to address McMahan’s paradox about person-affecting principles.